Monday, June 12, 2006

wrr: iran, irant, irate

The US administration’s recent reversal on the question of diplomatic negotiations with Iran may have left us breathing a bit easier, but some observers remain skeptical. The roots of that skepticism go back to a history available in any standard encyclopedia—Britannica, for instance. In 1951, Mohammad Mossaddeq was democratically elected prime minister of Iran, and immediately nationalized the country’s oil industry. In 1953 a coup funded by the CIA overthrew Mossaddeq’s government. The Shah returned to Iran, and a Western multinational consortium accelerated Iranian oil development. There was no further talk of nationalization, as the Shah repressed political dissent within Iran. Opposition to the Shah led, of course, to his ouster in 1979 by a coalition of leftist and religious dissidents, and ultimately to the current Islamic republic.

Tom O’Donnell in an article for Z magazine
draws some of the evident conclusions from this and other evidence.
Just as the true reasons for the U.S.-British invasion of Iraq were not “weapons of mass destruction” or “links to Al Qaeda,” so too, the true reason for the present U.S.-Iran crisis is not the ostensible “nuclear threat” posed by Iran. Rather, the American push against Iran’s nuclear program and for “regime change” is about maintaining American hegemony in the oil-rich Persian Gulf Region.
As one might not learn from the mainstream media, but can learn from other sources including the United Nations website, Iran has signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, under which states have the right to pursue nuclear power. To that end, they have been trying to enrich uranium for fuel, a very different matter than building a bomb or even than enriching uranium for use in a bomb. As Juan Cole has pointed out on his blog, the Iranians have something like the ability to make those old Mickey Mouse watches that glowed in the dark because they were painted with radium.

Hans Blix, chair of the U.N.'s WMD Commission, noted on a recent Democracy Now that there are reasons why the Iranians might want nuclear weapons:
They see 130,000 American soldiers in Iraq and they see American bases in Pakistan and in Afghanistan and more American military activities to the north of them. . . .It is not inconceivable that [they] may feel that their security is being threatened.
Especially with US politicians saying all options are on the table.

But O’Donnell argues that
even if they were near to building a nuclear bomb, Iranian nukes would not, per se, be why Washington is out to remove the mullahs from power. Just this February, Bush was . . . pleased to recognize India as a nuclear power . . . . He did this after India sided with the U.S. against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency {the I.A.E.A}. So too, Bush hasn’t insisted that Pakistan, a country which admits to having proliferated nuclear weapons . . . give up its illegally developed nuclear weapons – rather, he called Pakistan a “close ally” of America.

Neither India, nor Pakistan, nor Israel has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Mina Hamilton on dissidentvoice.org points out that
Israel's nuclear facilities have never been inspected by the I.A.E.A or any other representative of the international community. The existence of the nuclear arsenal sitting deep underground in the Negev desert continues to be scrupulously ignored by . . . most . . . US establishment media. Also off the radar is the fate of UN Security Resolution 687 [which] ended the Gulf War of 1991. It was signed by the US and called for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
O’Donnell argues that
the reason for U.S. hostility to Iran can neither be explained by nukes nor by Islamic fundamentalism, nor, for that matter, by any Iranian support for terrorist organizations. Rather, the uncompromising first principle for Washington when it comes to Iran, or to any other state in the Persian Gulf Region, is that the U.S. and the U.S. alone shall remain the regional hegemon – which is … about oil.
… Whoever has predominant influence in this region has their hand on “the global oil spigot” – a prize which brings enormous power and leverage far beyond the region itself, reaching over every country and enterprise that needs the region’s oil. Washington has worked since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 to keep Iran … from once again becoming the oil-producing powerhouse it was under the shah, . . .
O’Donnell points out that since 1996 the US has imposed sanctions on Iran to block development of its oil and natural gas resources, and the sanctions have been devastatingly successful . . . They have preserved U.S. hegemony in the Gulf Region from any significant threat by Iran, and, as a bonus to the U.S., have greatly weakened the Iranian economy and the mullahs’ domestic position.

They have also prompted potential concessions we hear little about. Juan Cole has noted on his blog that in 2003 Iran offered the US full cooperation with the IAEA-- and more--including Recognition of Israel within 1967 borders. In response, Bush reprimanded the Swiss embassy for daring to forward the proposal, because, Cole argues, Bush and his various constituencies (including the military-industrial complex…) do not want peaceful relations with Iran.

And they may not get what they do not want.

Frida Berrigan and William Hartung, writing on TomPaine.com last week, observe that the US proposal--that Iran will be allowed to continue its enrichment program, as long as it agrees to first suspend all activity, and “prove” that its intentions are entirely civilian—sets the bar awfully high. They note that,
One administration official has indicated that a rejection of the U.S. overture by Iran may in fact be the White House’s objective. Such a rebuff would allow the Bush administration to take forceful action without being seen as unreasonable unilateralists.

This cynical approach is similar to U.S. actions in the run-up to the Iraq war, when President Bush falsely claimed that a diplomatic solution was possible even after the decision to attack Saddam Hussein's regime had been [taken].
Berrigan and Hartung ask,
What would the United States be doing if it were truly committed to a diplomatic resolution? In addition to pursuing a more gradual approach that would give the negotiating process months or years, not weeks, to bear fruit, non-aggression pledges by the United States and Israel might get things moving.. . . . The clearest route to a nuclear-free Iran, is a nuclear-free Middle East. [and ] The clearest route to a nuclear-free Middle East is concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament by nuclear heavyweights. And that has to start with the heaviest heavy of all—the United States of America.